Fiscal Competition, Convergence and Agglomeration

This paper analyzes the impact of fiscal competition through infrastructure in a New Economic Geography framework. It is shown that regional competition leads to convergence if the trade costs are high but induces divergence if trade cost have fallen below a certain value. Moreover, fiscal competition yields an overprovision if the trade costs are sizable while it leads to underprovision if the regions are highly integrated. Finally, a trade-off between regional convergence and efficiency arises since the efficient distribution of regional infrastructure requires full agglomeration for sufficiently low trade costs.fiscal competition, infrastructure, agglomeration

Absorptive capacity and the growth and investment effects of regional transfers : a regression discontinuity design with heterogeneous treatment effects

Researchers often estimate average treatment effects of programs without investigating heterogeneity across units. Yet, individuals, firms, regions, or countries vary in their ability, e.g., to utilize transfers. We analyze Objective 1 Structural Funds transfers of the European Commission to regions of EU member states below a certain income level by way of a regression discontinuity design with systematically heterogeneous treatment effects. Only about 30% and 21% of the regions - those with sufficient human capital and good-enough institutions - are able to turn transfers into faster per-capita income growth and per-capita investment. In general, the variance of the treatment effect is much bigger than its mean

Migration and Trade

Theoretical and empirical research in economics suggests that bilateral migration triggers bilateral trade through a number of channels. This paper assesses the functional form of the impact of migration on trade flows in a quasi-experimental setting. We provide evidence that the relationship is not log-linear. In particular, at small levels of migration (stocks) the elasticity of trade to migration is quite high, and it declines to zero at about 4,000 immigrants. If migration stocks exceed such a level, the evidence suggests that trade will not increase anymore. This suggests that cross-country network and other effects flowing from migration materialize at relatively low levels of migration, but there appears to be satiation as immigrant numbers increase by much.migration, bilateral trade, quasi-randomized experiment, generalized propensity score estimation

The persistent effects of place-based policy: Evidence from the West-German Zonenrandgebiet

We show that temporary place-based subsidies generate persistent effects on economic density. As our design allows us to control for agglomeration economies, we attribute an important role to policy-induced locational advantage (e.g. capital structures) in explaining persistent spatial patterns of economic activity. With regard to distributional implications, we show that subsidies have capitalized in land rents, so pre-treatment land owners have benefitted predominantly from the program

On the optimal design of place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers

We quantify general equilibrium effects of place-based policies in a multi-region framework with population mobility, trade and agglomeration economies. Using detailed data on EU transfers, we infer the local effects of different transfer types on productivity, income and transportation cost. Based on these estimates and the general equilibrium model we derive the spatial distribution of economic activity and the resulting aggregate welfare effects if (i) no transfers were paid and taxes set to zero, (ii) transfers were distributed uniformly, (iii) transfers were welfare-optimally distributed. Characterizing the optimal distributions, we reveal complementarities between transfer types and between transfers and local endowments

Going NUTS: The Effect of EU Structural Funds on Regional Performance

The European Union (EU) provides grants to disadvantaged regions of member states to allow them to catch up with the EU average. Under the Objective 1 scheme, NUTS2 regions with a GDP per capita level below 75% of the EU average qualify for structural funds transfers from the central EU budget. This rule gives rise to a regression-discontinuity design that exploits the discrete jump in the probability of EU transfer receipt at the 75% threshold. Additional variability arises for smaller regional aggregates - so-called NUTS3 regions - which are nested in a NUTS2 mother region. Whereas some relatively rich NUTS3 regions may receive EU funds because their NUTS2 mother region qualifies, other relatively poor NUTS3 regions may not receive EU funds because their NUTS2 mother region does not qualify. We find positive growth effects of Objective 1 funds, but no employment effects. A simple cost-benefit calculation suggests that Objective 1 transfers are not only effective, but also cost-efficient.structural funds, regional growth, regression discontinuity design, quasi-randomized experiment

Konvergenz- und Wachstumseffekte der europäischen Regionalpolitik in Deutschland

This paper uses German evidence to address two questions about corporate governance. The effects of ownership on corporate governance have received much recent attention, but very little of this has been devoted to the appropriate way to measure firm ownership. The results of this paper show that the conclusions reached about the effects of ownership on corporate governance can depend critically on the particular ownership measure used, and that the widely-used weakest-link principle is wholly unsatisfactory as a means of dealing with the issues raised by pyramid ownership structures. The paper also shows that greater ownership concentration typically weakens the link between managerial pay and firm profitability. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis, emphasised in the recent literature on the USA, that large owners are a complement to, rather than a substitute for, such a link.Convergence, strucutral policy, EU

Going NUTS: The Effect of EU Structural Funds on Regional Performance

The European Union (EU) provides grants to disadvantaged regions of member states to allow them to catch up with the EU average. Under the Objective 1 scheme, NUTS2 regions with a GDP per capita level below 75% of the EU average qualify for structural funds transfers from the central EU budget. This rule gives rise to a regression-discontinuity design that exploits the discrete jump in the probability of EU transfer receipt at the 75% threshold. Additional variability arises for smaller regional aggregates - so-called NUTS3 regions - which are nested in a NUTS2 mother region. Whereas some relatively rich NUTS3 regions may receive EU funds because their NUTS2 mother region qualifies, other relatively poor NUTS3 regions may not receive EU funds because their NUTS2 mother region does not qualify. We find positive growth effects of Objective 1 funds, but no employment effects. A simple cost-benefit calculation suggests that Objective 1 transfers are not only effective, but also cost-efficient